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what people are writing about

BOOKS
The Sovereign State of ITT by
Anthony Sampson, Stein and Day
Publishers, New York, 1973, 323
pages, $10.

This impressionistic portrait of
one of America’s most controversial
corporations was written by a poli
tical writer rather than a business
reporter—and it shows. Accountants
will find the book thin and lacking
in concreteness. It is, nevertheless,
an important book, for it raises some
disturbing questions about the role
of the multinationals in national
and international affairs.

The International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation first burst
upon the consciousness of the non
business sector of the American
public when it became embroiled
in two major scandals: the affair of
the Dita Beard memo, with its im
plications that ITT had offered to
underwrite San Diego’s lukewarm
bid for the 1972 Republican con
vention in exchange for Antitrust
Division approval of its merger with
The Hartford Insurance Group;
and the affair of its alleged inter
vention in the Chilean elections of
1970, in which it apparently tried
to get the Central Intelligence Ag
ency to go along with it in creating
“economic chaos” in Chile in order

to prevent the rise to power of the
late Salvador Allende.
These two incidents are, natur
ally, the climax of this book, and
they are explored in detail. But the
author, an editor of the London
Observer, tries to do much more.
He tries to present a full-scale por
trait of this remarkable corpora
tion, which, he thinks, embodies
many of the virtues and defects of
those two industrial phenomena of
our age, the conglomerates and the
multinationals.
To show the shaping of ITTs
character (if such a word can be
used for a corporation), the author
goes back to its founder, Sosthenes
Behn, a flamboyant tycoon who
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built ITT into the world’s major in
ternational manufacturer and oper
ator of telephone systems. He tells
how Behn collaborated actively and
ardently with the Nazis before and
during World War II; how he
played fast and loose with the
Communists during the Cold War
in a risky game that eventually
led to the jailing of two of his exe
cutives as spies in Hungary and the
execution of two other men; and
how he lobbied and manipulated
officials in Britain, Canada, and the
United States in an (eventually un
successful) effort to build a new
transatlantic cable.

Effective and ruthless
All these operations, according to
Mr. Sampson, suggest that ITTs
own “diplomatic and intelligence
services were more effective, and
also more ruthless, than those of
the Western nations it dealt with
. . . How continuous are the char
ters of corporations? ... in two cen
tral respects it still resembles
Behn’s invention. First, it is still
constructed around a single domi
nating head . . . Second, ITT still
regards itself as above govern
ments, above controls, and above
morals. It presents itself still as an
American company in America,
British in Britain, German in Ger
many; but it owes loyalty to none
of them, and regards each govern
ment as an unnecessary obstruc
tion . . . throughout its five decades,
it has remained irresponsible and
uncontrollable.” It is, says the
author, “like a jellyfish, both every
where and nowhere.”
The bulk of the book, however,
deals with ITT’s history under the
leadership of Harold S. Geneen,
the Lybrand alumnus who became
the highest-paid manager in the
world. He changed ITT from a
holding company, “investing in fac
tories thousands of miles away and
hoping for the best,” into a tightly
controlled international conglomer
ate so centralized and so indoc
trinated that it is almost “a closed
system.” Taking a dim view of
ITT’s prospects abroad, he reduced
its dependence on foreign earnings
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from 82 per cent to 40 per cent,
largely embarking on a major do
mestic merger binge. In the pro
cess he brought ITT up the size
ladder of American corporations
from fifty-second in 1959 to ninth
in 1970.
Actually, the author thinks, Gen
een’s diversification was not neces
sary; ITT’s foreign holdings, he
says, are still the most profitable
part of its business. But the acquisi
tions have made ITT a power to be
reckoned with domestically.
The author traces the history of
the major acquisitions, with par
ticular attention to the methods
that were used to get them. He
criticizes the “unaccountable ac
counting” that enabled ITT in Feb
ruary, 1973, to report record earn
ings for the fifty-fourth successive
quarter. He attacks the pooling of
interests accounting by which “a
conglomerator could absorb the
merger company’s net assets at their
old book value, even though he
paid a huge premium on the ac
quisition. Then the conglomerator
could dispose of these acquired
assets, and the proceeds, which
were compared to the historical
cost, could show enormous book
keeping profits, which could appear
on the conglomerates’ statements
as if they had really been earned.”
And he takes a swipe at Arthur
Andersen & Co. for going along
with these devices at ITT.
Chiefly, however, the author’s
concern is with the emerging inde
pendent power of the multinational
companies: “The serious issue is
not whether multinationals should
be allowed, but how they should
be controlled and counterbalanced.
The scale of industrial development
has far outstripped the scale of poli
tical development, a discrepancy
which ruthless companies can easily
exploit. ITT has been especially
able to exploit it, not only through
its size and diversity but through
its tradition of deviousness and
many-sidedness, and its mastery of
communications.”
ITT, the author thinks, is “a cari
cature of a multinational conglom
erate, not a typical example.” Yet

“some of its traits . . . are ones
which others are tempted to follow.
And many of the questions which
arose from the ITT scandals and
hearings have a wider relevance.
Has private power, as Senator Hart
asked, now extended its reach so
far that no government can control
it? Does the scale of world trade
necessitate giant conglomerates,
which their home government can
not afford to defy? Do they have
the right, and the power, to create
their own foreign policy?”
This book has many flaws. It
covers a lot of ground somewhat
superficially, reflecting the haste
with which it was prepared in or
der to capitalize on ITT’s headlines.
The author lacks the technical and
business training really to put it all
together, and, despite his frequent
references to interviews and hear
ing records, much of the book reads
like a rehash of the daily press.
Many readers would like some
thing much deeper. Accountants,
for example, will find that his at
tack on conglomerate accounting
procedures adds nothing to what
they already know, and students of
management will feel frustrated
that the allegedly unique and in
credibly effective control system
that Geneen has set up is not really
explained.
Even so, this is a consequential
and worthwhile book. Its author
sees clearly what is important and
what is not important about ITT
and the other conglomerates and
multinationals, and he asks the
right questions. It is up to more
sophisticated analysts to take it
from there.

Zero-Base Budgeting: A Practical
Management Tool for Evaluating
Expenses by Peter A. Pyhrr, John
Wiley & Sons, New York, 1973, 231
pages, $13.95.
A great idea but a lot of work—
that will probably be the immediate
reaction of any manager—or even
any accountant—who confronts zero
base budgeting for the first time.
This book, by the man who devel
oped this new planning-budgeting
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technique, is not likely to change
any minds on either score. Every
consultant needs to read it just the
same.
In a 1969 speech Dr. Arthur F.
Burns, then counsel to the Presi
dent, identified the basic need for
zero-base budgeting: “Customarily,
the officials in charge of an estab
lished program have to justify only
the increase which they seek above
last year’s appropriation. In other
words, what they are already
spending is usually accepted as
necessary, without examination.
Substantial savings could undoubt
edly be realized if [it were required
that] every agency . . . make a case
for its entire appropriation request
each year, just as if its program or
programs were entirely new.”
However, as Dr. Burns pointed
out, “Such budgeting procedure
may be difficult to achieve, partly
because it will add heavily to the
burdens of budget-making, and
partly also because it will be re
sisted by those who fear that their
pet programs would be jeopardized
by a system that subjects every . . .
activity to annual scrutiny of its
costs and results.”
Actually, according to this au
thor, just such a technique is cur
rently in use in Texas Instruments,
Inc., and in the government of the
State of Georgia, and it has not
made budget-making impossible.
Indeed, he says, “. . . effectively
planned and properly managed,
zero-base budgeting can actually
reduce the burdens of budget mak
ing while significantly improving
management decision making and
the allocation of resources.”
In the typical budgeting process,
Mr. Pyhrr points out, most corpor
ations and government agencies use
current operating and expenditure
levels as a base, from which they
analyze in detail only those in
creases (or decreases) desired—
thus looking at only a small frac
tion of the final budget dollars ap
proved. This approach leaves two
major questions unanswered: “How
efficient and effective are the cur
rent operations that were not evalu
ated? Should current operations be
November-December, 1973

reduced in order to fund higher
priority new programs or increase
profits?”

Three common problems
After an experience with the tra
ditional type of cost reduction, a
group at Texas Instruments identi
fied “three problems that I think
are common in budget procedures
throughout industry and govern
ment:
“1. Some goals and objectives
had not been established, or stated
goals and objectives as understood
and anticipated by top management
were not realistic in light of the
final amount of money budgeted.
(In my conversations with several
other companies, I have been told
that they first establish their bud
gets and then determine their goals
and objectives—which seems to put
the cart before the horse.)
“2. Some operating decisions had
not been made that affected the
amount of money required. . . .
“3. Budget dollars were not
strictly allocated in accordance with
changing responsibilities and work
loads. Some work loads had in
creased significantly while others
had decreased, yet everyone had
his budget cut from 1 to 10 per
cent.”
As a result, Mr. Pyhrr reports, he
developed “the planning and bud
geting methodology that we termed
zero-base budgeting. The tech
nique was used to prepare the 1970
budget for the staff and research
divisions of Texas Instruments. Mr.
Pyhrr later installed the system
for the State of Georgia (beginning
with the fiscal year 1973), and it
also has “been adopted by other
corporations and governmental
agencies.”
Zero-base budgeting “requires
each manager to justify his entire
budget request in detail and puts
the burden of proof on him to jus
tify why he should spend any
money” at all, Mr. Pyhrr explains.
For each activity or operation un
der his control each manager must
prepare a “decision package” which
includes an analysis of cost, pur
pose, alternative courses of action,

measures of performance, conse
quences of not performing the ac
tivity, and benefits. In addition to
identifying different ways of per
forming the activity, managers must
analyze different levels of effort for
it. They must identify a minimum
level of spending and then, in sepa
rate decision packages, analyze the
costs and benefits of additional lev
els of spending. This analysis “for
ces every manager to consider and
evaluate a level of spending lower
than his current operating level;
gives management the alternative
of eliminating an activity or choos
ing from several levels of effort;
and allows tremendous trade-offs
and shifts in expenditure levels
among organizational units.”
Once the decision packages have
been developed, they must be
ranked or listed in order of im
portance. This ranking process “al
lows each manager to explicitly
identify his priorities, merges de
cision packages for ongoing and
new programs into one ranking;
and allows top management to
evaluate and compare the relative
needs and priorities of different or
ganizations to make funding deci
sions. As the list of decision pack
ages increases the cost also in
creases, and top management can
decide at what point on the list the
added costs outweigh the bene
fits.”
Zero-base budgeting, according
to Mr. Pyhrr is applicable to ad
ministrative, technical, and most
commercial portions of the bud
get; it is not directly adaptable
to direct production and manufac
turing costs, but it can be used for
expenses that are closely related
to direct manufacturing operations,
such as maintenance, supervision,
production planning, and other
manufacturing support services. It
is also adaptable to capital expendi
ture analysis. “Although zero-base
budgeting may apply to only a
fraction of the total budget in a
heavy manufacturing organization,
the activities subject to zero-base
budgeting techniques are usually
the most difficult to plan and con
trol and yet offer management the
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greatest lever to affect profits,” Mr.
Pyhrr says. In government, since
government is a service organiza
tion, the technique is applicable
across the board.
Zero-base budgeting is more work
and takes more time than tradi
tional budgeting, Mr. Pyhrr con
cedes, especially at the beginning.
However, in the second year of
zero-base budgeting at Texas In
struments, the cycle “was reduced
to half the first year calendar time,
which was less than the time spent
under the previous budgeting pro
cedures.”
The advantages, Mr. Pyhrr claims,
are many: “Zero-base budgeting
provides top management with de
tailed information concerning the
money needed to accomplish de
sired ends. It spotlights redundan
cies and duplication of efforts
among departments, focuses on dol
lars needed for programs rather
than on the percentage increase
(or decrease) from the previous
year, specifies priorities within and
among departments and divisions,
allows comparisons across these
organizational lines as to respective
priorities funded, and allows a
performance audit to determine
whether each activity or operation
performed as promised.”
In the book Mr. Pyhrr describes
in considerable detail how to pick
the levels at which decision pack
ages are to be prepared, how to
design the packages, how to rank
them, how to install the program,
how to keep it going, how to use
it to supplement or to replace
Planning - Programing - Budgeting
(PPB), how to use computers in
the process, and how to evaluate
results. The appendixes present a
sample zero-base budgeting man
ual and suggest activities for which
decision packages may be devel
oped.
A great deal more is going to be
heard about this technique in the
years to come. For that reason, if
for no other, every consultant needs
to have zero-base budgeting in his
bag of tricks and every accountant
needs to have at least a nodding
acquaintance with its principles.
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This is the definitive book on the
subject.

The Corporate Computer: How
to Live with an Ecological Intru
sion by Norman Sanders, McGrawHill Book Company, New York,
1973, 161 pages, $10.

How to run a computer opera
tion in 19 easy chapters—many
readers would like to have such a
book; many authors have tried to
write it; here it is at last.
Suppose that you, as an ordinary
manager with no experience in
computers, have suddenly been
ordered to set up a computer opera
tion in your company. This doesn’t
happen as often as it used to, but
it’s not impossible even today. What
do you do?
This book sets up such a situa
tion and tells you how to handle it
—from how to decide whether or
not to accept the assignment to
planning your first expansion. It
really does.
The author, a Briton with more
than 20 years of computer experi
ence in Europe, has a gift for dif
ferentiating wheat and chaff. In less
than 150 pages he takes the reader
through every step of computer
management, concentrating on bas
ic principles yet never neglecting
vital procedural details. He is never
dogmatic; where there are alter
native ways of doing things he out
lines the pros and cons; yet he is
not afraid to take a firm stand on
such issues as how to deal with
users, with suppliers, with pro
gramers, and with top manage
ment. His style is light, sometimes
funny, clear, concrete, and emin
ently readable.
No significant aspect of computer
management is omitted. Among the
chapter topics: Why you should
reject the appointment and what
to expect if you don’t; the reasons
for acquiring a computer; getting
the backing of the top man; the
fiscal impact; the need for a cor
porate plan, its appearance and
promulgation around the company;

the need for a technical assistant,
how to choose him, the function
he is to perform; organization of
the systems department; organiza
tion of the service department; con
verging on the configuration; the
selection process; the contract; how
to hire and keep technical people;
project control; standards and files;
programing; how to help the man
ufacturer help you; finding out
whether the computer is working;
maintenance; documentation; op
erational research; measurement of
results; and forecasting. Appendixes
present a glossary of terms and a
description of how to set up a
“war room.”
After reading this book the man
ager will really feel equipped to
run a computer department. This
may be an illusion, but if it can be
done by the book, this is the book
to do it by.

Corporate Power in America by
Ralph Nader and Mark J. Green,
Grossman Publishers, New York,
1973, 309 pages, $7.95.
The modern corporation has
grown too powerful for the public
good and must be curbed. That is
the assumption rather than the
thesis of this book, which concen
trates on solutions.

Corporations must be made “re
sponsible to more than merely their
own self-contained rules and nar
row horizons,” the authors of this
book declare in the preface. “As
law professor Abe Chayes has writ
ten, ‘the modern business corpora
tion emerged as the first successful
institutional claimant of significant
unregulated power since the nation
state established its title in the six
teenth and seventeenth centuries.’
Our large corporations are unparal
leled as buffers shielding their ex
ecutive decision-makers from public
inquiry and accountability. A sup
posed democracy should not suffer
the exercise of such uncontrolled
power.”
Only a few of the speakers at
Ralph Nader’s Conference on Cor
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porate Accountability, which was
held in Washington, D. C., in the
fall of 1971 and on which this book
is based, bother to document this
charge. A few supporting accusa
tions are made: The antitrust laws
have failed to restore the power of
the marketplace; regulatory agen
cies have become arms of the in
dustries they supposedly watchdog;
corporations influence Congress and
virtually dictate to the Administra
tion; the corporation, in the words
of Professor John K. Galbraith, has
assimilated itself to the state.
But on the whole the speakers—
economists, political scientists, and
lawyers who have “distinguished
themselves by their studies and
commentary on corporate power”—
accept the problem as given and
concentrate on possible solutions.
Those solutions vary widely. Pro
fessor Galbraith predicts that even
tually all the great corporations will
become public enterprises. Con
gressman Fred Harris recommends
reform of campaign financing, the
end of income deductions for lob
bying, a ban on political activity
by corporations, elimination of the
tax deductibility of institutional ad
vertising, antitrust action to break
up monopolies, and Federal char
tering of corporations.

Social moves discounted
Actually, Federal chartering, the
cornerstone of Mr. Nader’s own
proposals, is implicit in the recom
mendations of most of the speakers.
But others go off in other direc
tions as well, depending on their
fields of interest. Professor John J.
Flynn, seeing employees as the
“only visible, practical, and legiti
mate constituency of the corpora
tion,” wants them represented on
the board of directors. Robert Town
send offers “a modest proposal” for
a public director. Professor Andrew
Hacker advocates more consumer
and citizen action of the Nader
type.
Joel F. Henning, a fellow of the
Adlai Stevenson Institute of Inter
national Affairs, dismisses the cor
porate social responsibility move
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ment as a “shell game,” and most
of the other speakers apparently
agree, for their emphasis is on com
pulsion-action by Congress, regu
latory bodies, and the courts.

Legal action plan urged
Professor Arthur S. Miller draws
up an action plan for the judiciary:
Enforce the antitrust laws more
stringently, use mandatory orders to
make the bureaucracy" govern more
adequately,” enlarge the class ac
tion category, allow shareholders
greater access to the corporate de
cisional process, permit qui tam ac
tions to enforce antipollution laws,
further enlarge the category of
those with standing to bring the
administrative process or judiciary
into operation, apply constitutional
norms to corporate activity, and
allow more legal actions to be
brought against the companies
themselves, as in stockholders’ de
rivative suits. Professor Walter
Adams suggests a host of specific
prohibitions and obligations, under
Federal charter, for corporations
with assets over $250 million and
corporations that rank among the
top eight producers in an industry
where the eight firms among them
control 70 per cent or more of the
market. Such corporations would
be prohibited from making acquisi
tions; granting or receiving any
discrimination in price, service, or
allowances unless such discrimina
tion could be demonstrated to be
justified by savings in cost; engag
ing in tie-in arrangements or exclu
sive dealerships, and participating
in any scheme of interlocking con
trol over any other corporations. In
addition, such corporations should
be required to serve all customers
on reasonable and nondiscrimina
tory terms, license their patents and
know-how, and pursue pricing
and product policies calculated to
achieve capacity production and
full employment.
For accountants, probably the
most interesting recommendations
are those of Professor Willard F.
Mueller, who calls for much more
disclosure of corporate information

to the public. He wants segmented
disclosure of investment, revenue,
and profit data by product lines
drawn as narrowly as possible, pub
lic disclosure of product sales, pub
lic access to income and other Fed
eral tax returns of large corpora
tions, disclosure of intercorporate
holdings, disclosure of publicly
owned facilities operated or leased
by private corporations, disclosure
of foreign operations, disclosure of
social costs, and public representa
tion on the board of directors.
This is a provocative and con
troversial book. If some of the pro
posals seem extreme, it may well
be that this is the grave American
business has dug for itself. (Ref
erences to ITT as a horrible
example are rife throughout the
book.) Most of the speakers at this
Nader conference were not wild
eyed radicals, and this book may
be an indication of the direction in
which public opinion is swinging.

Confessions of a Corporate Head
hunter by Allan J. Cox, Trident
Press, New York, 189 pages, $6.95.

The world of the executive re
cruiter is a mysterious and glamor
ous one to most managers. This
hook does a better job of dispelling
the glamor than the mystery, but it
does offer a few helpful hints for
both employer and employee.
In the preface to this book the
author offers three reasons for writ
ing it:
Out of “benign compassion” for
today’s mobile executive, he wanted
to offer some advice on “coping
with corporate wisdom.”
On the basis of the insights he
has gained as a corporate head
hunter, he wanted to add to the
general reader’s understanding of
corporate organization.
He sought to “present a challenge
to American business” to reorder
its priorities and make itself more
appealing to the crop of young exe
cutives coming up.
All this is quite an order for a
book of less than 200 pages, and,
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as might be expected, he doesn’t
quite make it. The goals are too
varied to make for a unified book,
and the result lacks both cohesion
and depth.

Advice for prospect

The most interesting part of the
book—and also the most successful
—is Mr. Cox’s advice to the so-call
ed “candidate.” He tells how to get
into contact with a recruiter with
out letting him suspect you are
looking for a job, how to play hard
to get, how to wend your way
through the little rituals of the
courtship, how to deal with psy
chological tests (fake them or re
fuse to be subjected to them),
whether to ask for an employment
contract (a simple severance ar
rangement is better).
His advice to the client, apart
from an eminently sensible plea for
complete honesty in dealing with
the recruiter, is sketchy and rather
supercilious. (A corporation pres
ident reviewing this book in Busi
ness Week found this chapter “pre
sumptuous,” “sensational,” and “of
ten bizarre”) His suggestions on
how to deal with a candidate once
he has been presented seem laugh
ably obvious, but perhaps his rather
dim view of clients’ intelligence is
justified.
His advice to business as a whole
is sound and idealistic. The call for
a stronger corporate sense of social
responsibility, while neither orig
inal nor profound, is creditable and
seemingly sincere.
Also of general interest is Mr.
Cox’s description of the way cor
porate headhunters operate, al
though it is more a collection of
highly entertaining anecdotes than
a genuine explanation. In the pro
cess he manages subtly to denigrate
his competitors and imply that he
is just about the only man in the
business with sensitivity and integ
rity.
Here, perhaps, is the real clue
to what the book is all about. For
Mr. Cox is not proud of his profes
sion, which he characterizes as
“probably the most opportunistic,
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cynical, defensive, and manipula
tive of the corporate-service indus
tries.” (On the jacket blurb the
term corporate headhunter is de
fined as “a mediator between execu
tives who don’t understand their
problems and job candidates who
don’t care what the job is so long
as there is a quick buck to be
made.”) Often his real objective
in writing the book seems to be
self-justification rather than service
to the reader. Perhaps the title was
not chosen purely for sales appeal
but reflects the author’s true aim—
a cathartic apologia.
This is a book that promises a
lot more than it supplies, but it is
skillfully written, vastly entertain
ing, full of human interest—and it
contains a few nuggets of wisdom
that are relatively painless to
dredge out. Most executives will
enjoy reading it. Few will find it
changing the course of their lives.

Profiles of Involvement by the
Human Resources Network, Hu
man Resources Corporation, 2010
Chancellor Street, Philadelphia, Pa.,
19103, 1973, 843 pages in three
paper bound volumes, $60.

This group of lavishly illustrated
brochures presents the results of a
survey of corporate social action
programs.
Described in the text as “the first
national compendium of corporate
social involvement,” this book offers
brief descriptions of social action
programs in 186 corporations; 59
foundations, associations and non
profit corporations; and 40 govern
ment agencies.
The editors sent a form question
naire to organizations they thought
likely to have such programs, prom
ising to publish the resulting “pro
file forms” without “manipulating
or editing” the material other than
improving the grammar or format.
These profiles are the heart of the
book.
There is a little more. Volume 1
contains, in addition to introduc

tory material by the editors and
profiles of 535 social action pro
grams in the 186 corporations, a
section called “perspectives,” with
articles on corporate social respon
sibility by selected persons “in the
field” and selected speeches by
corporate representatives. Volume
2 contains an article in addition to
the profiles from nonprofit organi
zations and government. Volume 3
provides a bibliography (known
here as a “biblio-view”), glossaries,
and indexes.
The action programs themselves
are briefly summarized and inter
preted. The editors note that most
of the programs were launched
since 1970 as “band aid jobs” in
response to the crises of the 1960’s.
The greatest number of programs,
they report, are in the area of em
ployment-employee training, up
grading of job skills, and integra
tion of the hard core unemployed;
the second most popular category
is education, chiefly remedial or
compensatory education programs
aimed at minorities.
The most successful programs,
the editors find, have these char
acteristics: They involve participa
tion on the part of the people being
helped; they involve “an exchange
of perspectives”; and they are pro
grams that “in some way contrib
uted to a strengthening of self-es
teem.” Case studies of three pro
grams that have these character
istics are presented.
This book is described by the
editors as a “$300,000 experiment
in communications.” It is easy to
see that it may have cost $300,000.
The three volumes are an art di
rector’s delight, lavishly illustrated
with four-color photographs, paint
ings, and graphics, heavily adorned
with sidebars and other typographi
cal attention-getting devices. But it
is difficult to see in what sense it
is an “experiment in communica
tions,” unless the format is to be
considered experimental.
It is even more difficult to see
why $300,000 should have been
spent on it. The volumes are so
heavily encrusted with art work
that it is hard to figure out where
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the articles begin and end, who
wrote them, and what they deal
with. The editors’ contributions to
the book are so encumbered by
fine writing that merely to discover
what the book is about requires a
major effort on the reader’s part.
Human Resources Network de
scribes itself as “a nonprofit educa
tional corporation whose charter
purpose is to collect and dissemi
nate important information about
pressing social issues.” It describes
the purpose of the book as to pro
vide a “collective exchange of ideas
and experiences” about “corporate
expeditions into the social arenas.”
The accountant or businessman
probably would have preferred a
simply written, clearly presented
report of the information contained
in this book, which is substantial if
you can dig it out. Such a report
would not have cost $300,000, yet
it would have been more useful,
for the “experimental” format of
this work clearly impedes com
munication. For those who love to
look at pictures, it is another Ari
zona Highways.

The Foundations of Management
by Roy A. Lindberg, Oceana Pub
lications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.,
1973, 115 pages, $4.

This little volume represents one
mans philosophy of management.
That man, a management consul
tant in a CPA firm, is not a nation
ally known authority on manage
ment. He is, however, a thoughtful
man, and in this book he has made
an effort to distill the essence of his
thinking and experience for other
managers.

The theme of this book, accord
ing to Mr. Lindberg, is that “man
agement, to be performed compe
tently, requires more than experi
ence or knowledge, that it also
requires perceptions that may never
be proven by any form of interac
tion with the outside world. These
perceptions form the basis of man
agement as each manager practices
it.”
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A manager, Mr. Lindberg notes,
must make decisions whether he
possesses relevant knowledge or ex
perience or not. He must, then,
decide on the basis of “managerially
relevant generalizations so simple,
cogent, and persuasive they must
be labeled beliefs, values, convic
tions ... a true generalist ... is
a manager who . . . has decision
guides in the form of concepts
large, accommodating, earthy, and
attractive enough to be capable in
all situations of keeping him from
making serious errors.”

Manager must have philosophy

These concepts, he says, “must
also be mutually compatible and
woven into a comprehensive view.
Therefore, it can be said that every
successful manager has a philos
ophy—that is, a body of basic and
integrated views, tenets, or convic
tions.” This book is Mr. Lindberg’s
philosophy.
It presents “a number of proposi
tions . . . that appear to the author
to describe the basic character of
business and management and
managing as they exist in a ‘free’
economy. The propositions are
offered with full recognition of their
logical or empirical vulnerability,
but with the confidence that they
represent a step in the right direc
tion.”
The book is made up of 85 brief
ly discussed propositions—on the
nature of business, on the nature of
management, on the role of the
manager, on planning, on control,
and on “selected matters”—ranging
from “A Business’ Prime Responsi
bility Is to Survive” to “Organize
for Unknowns as well as Knowns.”
The majority of them, as the
author himself notes, are generally
familiar. “Some will not strike the
reader as having any importance,
and a few are likely to be rejected
as being totally unacceptable. No
harm. Consideration of the proposi
tions offered in these pages cannot
lead to worse than their rejection
because they seem obvious, unreal
istic or, even, absurd. On the other
hand, consideration of them may

stimulate new perspectives or ideas
of value to the manager.”
The manager or consultant who
likes to stop and take stock occa
sionally of what he is doing and
how he is doing it may find some
of these thoughts worthwhile.

MAGAZINES
A Direct Approach to Choice
Under Uncertainty by Morton I.
Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz,
Management Science, April, 1972.

For certain classes of problems,
an alternative conceptualization of
decision making under uncertainty
is considered. Under this direct ap
proach, decision making is viewed
as the selection of a modification
program for a given probability
distribution; practical applications
are developed for problem cover
ing preventive maintenance poli
cies, monopoly product pricing,
and R&D project planning.
In theory, decision making under
uncertainty in the past was consid
ered a problem in selecting the op
timal from a set of available prob
ability distributions. The selection
of a portfolio has been most often
used to illustrate this process. A
certain amount of funds are avail
able to distribute among the vari
ous securities, each having an as
sociated probability distribution
over the return it could yield. The
allocation of the funds among the
securities then results in a com
posite probability distribution over
the rewards from the entire port
folio. The decision is to choose
which allocation scheme maximizes
the utility of the return, or sim
ply to choose the best composite
distribution from the available set.
In some circumstances, it is ar
gued, this indirect approach is not
always the most natural. In the
portfolio selection problem, the
presence of a securities market en
ables the decision maker to modify
his set of probability distributions
and obtain a desired distribution.
In the absence of such a market,
the decision maker would have
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been forced to rely solely upon his
previous or “inherited” probability
distribution. Under these circum
stances, the decision maker could
modify his existing distribution
only by direct action. For example,
a firm may alter the failure rate of
its equipment by a policy of pre
ventive maintenance; thus, the in
voking of the policy is a direct
method to modify the probability
distribution over the date of ma
chine failure.
The authors contend that their
direct approach is more appropri
ate in those situations where the de
cision maker is unable to resort to
an existing market to obtain prob
ability distributions. In these cases,
the decision maker would select a
most preferred distribution over
payoffs by direct modification of
an existing or “inherited” proba
bility distribution, at some direct
monetary cost. This may be illus
trated where a monopolist faces
possible market entry by competi
tors.
By setting his prices at some rel
atively high mark, Po, the monopo
list stands to reap great profits;
however, his market also may be
invaded by competitors anxious to
share those profits with him. By low
ering his prices to some P1, where
Po > P1, the monopolist will be able
to discourage the market entry of
his rivals and prolong the period of
monopoly. The monopolist’s trade
off is the cost of reduced profits
against the payoff of extended mo
nopoly life. The monopolist, facing
the possibility of competition, thus
can directly modify the probabil
ity distribution governing such
market entry by means of pricing
policy.
This direct approach to decision
making under uncertainty should
be considered by accountants for
two reasons: 1) its theory and ap
plication is relatively simple and
straightforward; and 2) in most
problem areas encountered, the es
tablished market will be nonexist
ent. Undoubtedly many decision
makers are already familiar with
this decision process. For those
who are, this article may clarify
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your thinking. For those who
aren’t, it offers a new alternative.
Kenneth Ferris
The Ohio State University

Improving the Profitability of
Retail Merchandising Decisions
by Daniel J. Sweeney, Journal of
Marketing, January, 1973.

Mr. Sweeney notes the recent de
cline in the financial performance
of retail department stores and
suggests that the use of a modified
return-on-investment measure in
merchandising decisions may be
the answer. The article includes
the results of a simulation con
ducted by the author in support
of his proposal.
Mr. Sweeney feels that the de
cline in rate of return on owner’s
equity (from 8.98 per cent to 7.25
per cent between 1965 and l970)
can be traced to the turnover of
inventory. He cites the fact that
the ratio of net profit to inventory
cost fell from 19.08 per cent to
14.60 per cent between 1965 and
1970. This is due primarily to the
fact that while stores have success
fully raised their initial markups
from 40.28 per cent to 43.62 per
cent during that period, the rate
of stock turnover declined from
3.47 to 3.17 times.
Thus he concludes that mer
chandising executives, while con
cerned with margins, neglect over
all return on investment. Mr.
Sweeney feels that one of the
major causes for this neglect of
rate of return is the uncertainty
among both theorists and execu
tives as to an acceptable definition
of rate of return. He suggests that
the simplest, and at the same time
one of the most valid, is gross
margin return on investment
(GMROI). He defines this as gross
margin dollars divided by either
average or end-of-month inventory
investment. Alternatively it may be
calculated as the product of the
gross margin per cent times the
average rate of inventory turnover:

Gross
Margin Dollars
GMROI =
Net Sales
Net Sales
Average Inventory

Companies using retail valuation
for inventory may employ this re
tail inventory base in the calcula
tion. The gross margin return thus
completed, while not a measure of
return on investment, is still a use
ful measure.
Mr. Sweeney points out that not
only does GMROI provide a mea
sure of the management control of
the major asset of a retail firm,
but also allows comparisons be
tween the performance of product
lines or different divisions.
To test the validity of this mea
sure as it applies to retail deci
sions, he worked with a large mid
western department store to de
velop a model of their decision
making process. After the validity
of the model was established using
historical data, a corresponding
model was constructed using
GMROI as the primary decision
rule. A five-year simulation was
run with both models and the re
sults were compared using Wilcox
on matched pairs signed-ranks test
(used to measure overall variations
between a series of matched scores,
in this case certain monthly per
formance data).
Several things emerged from the
simulation. Volume increased using
GMROI due to the fact that the
number of stockouts dropped to
zero, reflecting the understocking
of some items and overstocking of
others. Markon and margin per
centages were virtually unchanged,
but gross margin dollars rose 11.81
per cent. Turnover increased 13.84
per cent while average inventory
value increased only 2.31 per cent.
GMROI increased 11.33 per cent
from an average monthly percent
age of 113.99 per cent under tradi
tional decision rules to an average
of 126.91 per cent under GMROI
rules.
In summary, it would seem that
the use of GMROI in making in
ventory decisions results in signifi-
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candy better inventory manage
ment with associated better prof
itability performance. Two things
should be pointed out, however.
First, the simulation was conducted
using data for stable merchandise
items. Thus one should be careful
when using GMROI with non
staples. This is not to say that it
is invalid, but only to say that
other factors must be given greater
weight.
The second, and probably the
major problem, is that of imple
mentation. As with any budgeting
or evaluation procedure, care must
be taken that the figures are real
istic. It must be remembered that
there may be valid differences
among departments even with a
generally
comparable
measure
such as this. Lastly, implementa
tion will involve fairly substantial
reorientation and reorganization
and will require a solid backing
from top management. Mr. Sween
ey presents a good case that the
end result is worth it.
David A. Patton, Jr.
The University of Virginia

The MBA and the Accounting
Profession by John J. McDon
ough, The CPA Journal, April,
1973.

The author presents some devel
opments and their implications for
the graduate business school and
the accounting profession. He sug
gests that the MBA’s knowledge of
accounting issues and the MBA’s
attitudes towards the accounting
profession will determine the fu
ture importance of accounting in
business schools.
During the last 20 years, accord
ing to John McDonough, the busi
ness school’s teaching and financial
interests have shifted from under
graduate to graduate education.
The number of schools granting
graduate degrees and the number
of students graduating from such
schools have increased. In addi
tion, graduate business schools
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have experienced two phenomena
(i.e., the education of large num
bers of MBAs and the research
emphasis of academic account
ants) which have implications for
the accounting profession.
MBAs weak in accounting

If importance is measured by
the number of graduates, the MBA
is the most important current
product of the graduate business
schools. The MBA has a heavy
bias towards financial management
positions in large corporations and
in financial institutions. Mr. Mc
Donough describes the MBA’s ac
counting knowledge as follows:
1. The MBA is oriented towards
managerial accounting aspects but
is weak in financial accounting as
pects.
2. The MBA is unfamiliar with
basic accounting processes and is
unable to link technical problems
with functional implications.
3. The MBA places a low value
on the accountant’s attest function.
4. The MBA bases his attitudes
towards the accounting profession
on the status and the competence
of the accounting professors that
he encounters as a student.

Accordingly, the MBA has a lim
ited knowledge of accounting is
sues and has a poor attitude to
wards the accounting profession.
The research emphasis in gradu
ate business schools has developed
for the following reasons:
1. Research support of the aca
demic accountant has covered the
costs of the research and has also
covered some university overhead
costs.
2. Research success of the aca
demic accountant has been re
quired for budget support, for in
fluence over university policies,
and for university promotions.
Accounting research provides an
important link between the aca
demic accountant and the business
community, but the MBA receives
no direct benefit from such re
search.

John McDonough suggests a
need for integration of research
and teaching efforts to provide for
professional management educa
tion. The proposal could be im
plemented in schools which re
quire two years of graduate educa
tion for the MBA degree. The suc
cess of the proposal will require
the cooperation of academic and
practicing accountants.
The academic accountant can
promote the integration of research
and teaching efforts by supporting
curriculum changes such as the fol
lowing:

1. If the MBA is searching for
electives, the academic accountant
must provide courses which will
broaden the student’s understand
ing of accounting issues.
2. If the MBA is pursuing ac
counting as a career, the academic
accountant must provide a threeor four-course sequence which will
give the MBA an adequate knowl
edge of accounting issues.
The practicing professional ac
countant can promote the integra
tion of research and teaching ef
forts by taking the MBA seriously
in the job market (i.e., by hiring
the MBA whenever possible) and
by using the MBA as a prime
source of managerial talent.
In summary, John McDonough
presents a proposal which will
keep accounting the premier dis
cipline in business schools. If the
integration of accounting research
and teaching efforts is not achieved,
large numbers of MBAs holding
positions which can influence the
future of graduate business schools
will have neither an adequate
knowledge of accounting issues nor
a favorable attitude towards the
accounting profession. The author
suggests the time is right for the
integration of research and teach
ing efforts, the facilities are already
available for such integration, and
the prospects look promising for
success from such integration.
Jerry L. Haugland
Oklahoma State University
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Leadership and Organizational
Performance: A Study of Large
Corporations, by Stanley Lieberson and James F. O’Connor, Amer
ican Sociological Review, April,
1972.
As a two-phase study on the re
lative importance of leadership in
fluence in the performance of a
firm, where performance is mea
sured by economic criteria, the in
fluence of changes in top manage
ment of a firm due to such factors
as the state of the economy, the
industry, and the firms overall per
formance position within the in
dustry are isolated for 167 firms
over a 20 year period. Three mea
sures of performance (sales, net
earnings, and profit margins) were
used.

Using an analysis of variance
technique to analyze the data, the
results of the first phase were that
leadership did not greatly influ
ence performance measured by the
first two variables. However, when
time lags were introduced to allow
for the possible long-term effects
of a leadership change, leadership
became the most important influ
ence on the third performance
variable, profit margins. (In this
study, profit margin is defined as
the ratio of gross margin to sales
revenue.)
The various constraints which
operate on top management, both
internal (committees, regulations,
standard procedures), and exter
nal (competitors, government reg
ulations, unions, customers and
supplies) are one set of factors re
stricting its influence with re
spect to sales and earnings. Also,
the effects of the other variables
(state of economy, industry, and
industry position) are less influen
tial with regard to profit margins
than the other two performance
measures.
The second phase of the study
broke the companies down into
their respective industries, to de
termine if different leadership ef
fects existed across different indus
tries. Some industrial characteris
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tics, such as degree of concentra
tion, advertising expenditures and
the number of vice-presidents em
ployed, were correlated across in
dustries in an attempt to outline
some characteristics of organiza
tions where leadership influence is
significant.
With respect to sales, it was
found that leadership influence
was high in concentrated indus
tries. With profit margins, on the
other hand, leadership impact was
high in industries low in labor
intensity. It was similarly found to
be so in rapid growth industries,
industries where advertising is im
portant, and also where the num
ber of vice-presidents in the in
dustry’s average company was rel
atively high. With regard to the
latter factor, it is suggested that a
large number of vice-presidents
may give top management tighter
control through better policy exe
cution and greater feedback on
company operations.

Overall results important
Although questions can certainly
be raised about the methodology,
which is not clearly explained and
validated, the overall results of the
study are of great interest.
In the divisionalized firm, where
assessment of responsibility and
overall performance of division
managers is generally made on the
basis of their net earnings perform
ance, the study suggests that they
should, perhaps, be evaluated on
the basis of their profit margins.
For here is where a manager can
apparently exert the most influence
and so his performance in exerting
it can be assessed, taking account
of the other variables as well. Fur
ther, this internal assessment meth
od, especially where divisions are
selling outside the organization,
may be able to be utilized to get a
better overall comparison of one
division against another, rather
than the net earnings criterion
which is currently utilized most
widely.
David C. Hayes
The Ohio State University

How Business School Students
Rate Corporations, Business and
Society Review, Summer, 1972.
Results of a survey of graduate
business students designed to rate
the social performances of 50 cor
porations are reported.

The survey was conducted by
the National Affiliation of Con
cerned Business Students, a new
nonprofit educational organization
of graduate business students whose
primary purpose is to promote re
search on social aspects of the cor
poration.
This brief article tabulates the
results of a questionnaire mailed to
300 graduate business students and
returned by 150. The appropriate
ness of the questionnaire and the
validity of the survey cannot be
analyzed because it is not pre
sented in the article, nor are the
statistical procedures used in the
survey described.
The ratings reflect participating
students’ evaluations of the respon
siveness of 50 corporations to so
cial problems. Possible corporate
averages ranged from a maximum
of 5.00 to a minimum of 1.00. The
highest average scores were at
tained by: Xerox, 4.12; First Penn
sylvania, 3.54; IBM, 3.54; Cummins
Engine, 3.48; and Prudential Insur
ance, 3.37. The worst averages were
received by: Con Edison (N.Y.),
1.81: Standard Oil (Calif.), 1.97;
U.S. Steel, 2.00; L.T.V., 2.11; and
Commonwealth Edison (Chicago),
2.12.
A significant aspect of the sur
vey is that it is not intended to re
flect a factual analysis of corporate
social policies, but rather the opin
ions of the participants. This would
appear to be a source of relevant
information for corporate busi
nesses. For instance, the survey
may reflect how effective a specific
corporation’s social policies have
been in establishing a social aware
ness image. Another possibility is
that the survey may hold a hint as
to why some corporations have dif
ficulty in recruiting the most prom
ising students as employees.
JoAnn S. DeVries
Oklahoma State University
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Accounting System for Earnings
Per Share by R. J. Huefner, Man
agement Accounting, March, 1972.

This article presents a formal
accounting system designed to fa
cilitate the complicated procedure
of maintaining the relevant infor
mation needed to compute earnings
per share.
As a result of Accounting Prin
ciple Board Opinion No. 15, the
once direct operation of computing
earnings per share has now become
a complicated process. Under Opin
ion No. 15 all securities which pos
sess a potential claim to common
shares must be identified, their ef
fect on earnings per share deter
mined, and, if appropriate, incor
porated into the computation. Each
of these securities may or may
not be included in the computation
of earnings per share and each se
curity may affect the computation
in a different manner. Because of
the difficulties caused by APB
Opinion No. 15, Mr. Huefner has
designed a practical accounting sys
tem to accumulate and maintain
the data relevant to the computa
tion of earnings per share.
The system provides a set of
self-balancing accounts which are
“in effect, proforma accounts.”
They are designed to accumulate
and maintain the permanent data
relevant to the computation of earn
ings per share and also to reflect
any temporary data employed in
the computation in a particular per
iod. Thus, the system provides all
data employed in the computation
of earnings per share in an organ
ized manner for each period.
Permanent information is re
corded in a set of permanent ac
counts and reflects securities that
are considered “common stock
equivalents.” Each security is re
corded in a manner that will facili
tate the computation of earnings
per share. The accounts for con
vertible securities serve as “contra
accounts” to the regular accounts
and, therefore, reflect the assump
tion of conversion. In the case of
options and warrants, entries are
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made to reflect the asset that would
be generated by exercise or con
version. These accounts normally
have debit balances, the offsetting
credit going to the “committed com
mon stock” account. Therefore, this
account reflects any potential in
crease in equity resulting from conversion or exercise of these residual
securities.
Generally, there will not be a
need for adjustments to the perman
ent accounts since common stock
equivalence is determined at the
date of issue of the security and
usually does not change. However,
if the conversion rate does change
during the life of a security, ad
justments will need to be made to
reflect the change in committed
common shares.
Mr. Huefner's accounting system
provides a set of temporary ac
counts which reflect temporary in
formation and adjustments needed
in the computation of earnings per
share. The adjustments are con
cerned with the “earnings available
for common stock.” These adjust
ments arise when the conversion of
residual securities would affect
these earnings in a dilutive man
ner. Other temporary accounts re
flect the residual securities that en
ter into the computation of “pri
mary” and “fully dilutive” earnings
per share.
Mr. Huefner’s system for account
ing for earnings per share is a very
uncomplicated and practical sys
tem. It should be of great value to
both management and public ac
countants. It provides a systematic
and organized method of accumu
lating and maintaining permanent
and temporary data used in the
computation of earnings per share
and, therefore, provides an organ
ized record of each year’s compu
tations and provides a base for the
following year’s computation. Be
cause of these organized records,
the auditing function will be greatly
enhanced since the procedures em
ployed in computing earnings per
share can be traced through these
accounts.
Charles S. Douthitt
Oklahoma State University

as you live
& breathe
give to
Christmas
Seals

CLASSIFIED
HELP WANTED
DIRECTOR EXECUTIVE PROGRAMS

responsibility for executive development
program at major southeastern state uni
versity. Spearheads planned continuing
education effort (seminars, short courses)
in university’s graduate business school.
MBA or PhD. Sound grounding in con
ducting continuing education programs.
Limited travel. Works with major cor
porate executives and university faculty.
Salary open. Send resume and minimum
salary expectations to box 892.

PROFESSIONAL
OPPORTUNITIES
MGT. CONSULTANTS PARTNERSHIP
OPPORTUNITY well established suc

cessful CMC with healthy consulting
practice seeks contacts with similarly
qualified individuals to establish new
quality firm with high growth potential.
Must be promotion oriented. Box 891.

RATES: Help Wanted, Professional Oppor
tunities and Miscellany 50 cents a word,
Situations Wanted 30 cents a word. Box
number, when used, is two words. Classi
fied advertisements are payable in advance.
Closing date, 5th of month preceding date of
issue. Address for replies: Box number, Man
agement Adviser, 666 Fifth Ave., N.Y. 10019.
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